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A BOY OF BOISE: IN DEFENSE OF IDAHO’S
MOST FAMOUS TOE-TAPPER
Alana Chazan*
“This is an airport—they’re supposed to watch out for terrorists and
bombs, not sit in a bathroom eight hours a day.”1
In 1961, the first sodomy statute was repealed in Illinois.2  Not
until 2003, under Lawrence v. Texas,3 were the last sodomy statutes
overturned.  In June 2007, Republican United States Senator Larry
Craig of Idaho was arrested for conduct which the arresting officer
believed was intended to convey a desire to engage in sodomy in an
airport bathroom.  This arrest highlights how, post-Lawrence, penal
statutes such as disorderly conduct and invasion of privacy are be-
ing used to curtail the symbolic speech of people who wish to en-
gage in consensual sex in places that are known as “tearooms”4—
public spaces where men have historically met for casual, imper-
sonal sex.5
The historical stigma and legal repercussions of being homo-
sexual led to the development of an intricate code of rules and
roles among tearoom participants.6  This code is a form of sym-
bolic speech that functions like a courtship ritual.7  While the code
serves many purposes, the ultimate purpose is for the fulfillment of
consensual private sex.8  Since consensual private sex is no longer
illegal, statutes used to punish actions taken in anticipation of pri-
* J.D. Candidate, City University of New York School of Law 2009; M.A. Political
Science, New School for Social Research, 2005; B.A., University of California Santa
Cruz, 2002. I would like to thank Professor Ruthann Robson for her encouragement
and guidance, the New York City Law Review for their diligence, and Taylor Xavier
for his thoughtful feedback and unyielding support.
1 Duff Wilson, Sting Charges Against Craig Harsher Than Some, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2007, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/washington/10craig.
html?emc=eta1 (quoting Defense Attorney Jonathan Burris, an attorney representing
five men arrested in the bathroom of the St. Paul Minneapolis International Airport
during the summer of 2007).
2 American Civil Liberties Union, History of Sodomy Laws and the Strategy That
Led Up to Today’s Decision, (June 16, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/discrim/
11895res20030616.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4 LAUD HUMPHREYS, TEAROOM TRADE: IMPERSONAL SEX IN PUBLIC PLACES 2–3 (Al-
dine De Gruyter ed., 1975) (1970).
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 2–3, 13, 81–82.
7 Id. at 13.
8 Id. at 2–3.
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vate sex must be more narrowly construed to prevent infringing
upon the tearoom participants’ free speech rights under the First
Amendment.
This Comment begins by examining the history of sodomy
statutes in the United States and the danger and stigma attached to
being homosexual.  Part I examines the role of tearooms, past and
present, and the intricate codes of speech that occur within them.
Part II examines the arrest of Senator Craig in a public restroom,
the specific bodily movements for which he was arrested, and the
Minnesota court’s denial of his attempt to withdraw his guilty plea.
Finally, Part III argues that the court’s interpretation of protected
speech under Minnesota’s disorderly conduct statute was inconsis-
tent with precedent.9  This section argues that Craig’s actions con-
stituted neither “fighting words”10 nor the solicitation of unlawful
activity,11 but rather protected symbolic speech.  This section will
also examine analogous cases of protected expressive conduct and
show why the First Amendment should protect symbolic speech of
the “tearoom trade.”
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SILENT SPEECH IN THE FACE OF
REPRESSIVE HOMOPHOBIA AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS FOR SODOMY
A. A History of Homophobia: Sodomy Statutes and Witch-Hunts
A high-profile politician, who was a loyal aide to the President,
a family man, and a father of six, was arrested for disorderly con-
duct after being found with another man in a public restroom.
The politician pled guilty without first consulting an attorney.  A
local newspaper uncovered the arrest, and the President’s attorney
put pressure on the paper to not run the story.  The newspaper ran
the story and, upon further investigation, discovered that this was
not the politician’s first arrest for disorderly conduct.  The politi-
cian was forced to resign from his position, leave Washington, and
subsequently had a nervous breakdown.  His name was not Larry
Craig, but instead Walter Jenkins.  He was the top aide to President
Lyndon Johnson, and the year was 1964.12
Two years after Walter Jenkins’s arrest in a YMCA bathroom
and the subsequent publicity surrounding it, a doctoral student
named Laud Humphreys began a sociological study of men who
9 See Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103 (W.D. Ark. 2000); In re S.L.J.,
263 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. 1978); State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1970).
10 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
11 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12 Martin F. Nolan, Low Falls From High Places, Sep. 1, 1996, BOSTON GLOBE, at D1.
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engaged in casual sex in public tearooms.13  Generally, tearooms
are public places where homosexual activity takes place in semi-
privacy, such as restrooms, dressing rooms, bus stations, or hotel
rooms.14  In light of the historical uses of sodomy laws and the stig-
mas attached to homosexual conduct generally, people who en-
gage in homosexual conduct stayed hidden from mainstream view
in pre-Stonewall America.15  To protect themselves from violence,
arrest, harassment, and social ostracism, people seeking to meet
others who wanted to engage in homosexual sex developed their
own language, signals, and codes.16  They found meeting places—
tearooms—which ideally were both public and private.17  On a so-
ciological level, the ideal place should be public enough to be
identifiable and to provide a significant number of participants,
but not so identifiable as to attract the “uninitiated” or those that
could be violent or hostile.18  At the same time the space should
also provide enough privacy that some form of sexual activity can
take place, while maintaining a certain level of anonymity.19
When Humphreys’ study took place in 1966, nearly all forms
of gender or sexual “deviancy” outside of state-sanctioned hetero-
sexual marriage were subject to some form of legal constraint.20
The few places where explicitly homosexual activity existed, such as
gay bars or tearooms, operated covertly since one risked arrest and
possible police brutalization for dancing with someone of the same
sex, cross-dressing, propositioning another adult homosexual, pos-
sessing a homophile publication, writing about homosexuality with-
out disapproval, displaying pictures of two people of the same sex
13 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 2–3.  According to Humphreys, “the only true tea-
room is one that gains a reputation where homosexual encounters occur . . . . They
are accessible, easily recognized by the initiate, and provide little public visibility.  Tea-
rooms thus offer the advantages of both public and private settings.” Id.
14 Id.
15 See generally MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1993).  On the evening of June 27,
1969, gay and transgender people fought back against the New York Police Depart-
ment which was attempting to conduct a raid against the Greenwich Village gay bar,
the Stonewall Inn. See, e.g., Ralph Randazzo, Elder Law and Estate Planning for Gay and
Lesbian Individuals and Couples, 6 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR 1, 8 n.4 (2004).  The
Stonewall Rebellion is commonly regarded at a watershed moment in gay civil rights
history. DUBERMAN, supra note 15, at xv (“‘Stonewall’ is the emblematic event in mod-
ern lesbian and gay history.”).
16 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 12.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Condi-
tions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 819 (1997).
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in intimate positions, operating a lesbian or gay bar, or actually
having sex with another adult homosexual.21  Every state in the
United States had either a common law or codified sodomy statute
by 1960.22  Sodomy was generally defined as any non-procreative
sexual act including masturbation, oral sex, and anal sex.23  Many
states carried lengthy prison sentences, including life sentences for
engaging in sodomy.24
When people were arrested for felony sodomy, or even lesser
charges of misdemeanor sodomy, sex-related vagrancy, or disor-
derly conduct, the subsequent repercussions were often similar to
what happened to political aide Walter Jenkins.  Local papers com-
monly printed the names of the people arrested with the accompa-
nying charge, the shame and stigma of which often lead to one
losing their job, their marriage, or their entire social standing.25  In
some states a convicted homosexual could lose their driver’s li-
cense,26 face mental institutionalization for being a “sexual psycho-
path,”27 or be discharged from the military.28  Licensed
professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and school teachers could
lose their certification,29 and a non-citizen could face deportation,
among other penalties.30  In their personal lives, people often lost
their families, friends, and community, even leading an unknown
number of people to commit suicide.31  The cumulative effect of
the legal repercussions—as well as the social stigmas of being “out”
as a homosexual32—was an intense shame and fear that kept most
people deep in the “closet.”33  The legal consequences of being
“out” have effectively “sealed that closet shut for most gays and les-
bians, while at the same time, outing others in state-sponsored
witchhunts.”34
21 Id.
22 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (“[B]efore 1961 all 50 States had outlawed sodomy.”).
23 Id.
24 See GA. STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES BIENNIAL REP. 11 (1943).
25 Eskridge, supra note 20, at 819.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 81.
32 The same stigmas and legal repercussions that attach to “out” individuals may
also apply to those who occasionally engage in homosexual conduct but do not iden-
tify as homosexual.  In this paper, I try not to classify all people who engage in homo-
sexual sex as necessarily homosexual, but rather to differentiate between homosexual
conduct and homosexual identity.
33 Eskridge, supra note 20, at 819.
34 Id.
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The most famous “witch-hunt” of homosexuals actually oc-
curred in Senator Larry Craig’s home state of Idaho, in the infa-
mous “Boys of Boise” scandal.35  On October 31, 1955, three men
were arrested in Boise, Idaho, and charged with having sex with
teenage boys.36  Boise at the time was a relatively small city with less
than 40,000 residents.37 The arrests rocked the city with scandal
and became front page news in The Idaho Statesman, a local newspa-
per, which ran numerous editorials calling for police, prosecution
and community action to “[c]rush the monster” supposedly taking
over the city.38  Over the next two years, more than 1500 men,
many of whom were prominent members of the town, were interro-
gated and sixteen were arrested under the state’s sodomy law.39
The city “was caught up in panic; one of the boys involved mur-
dered his father; the chief of police was fired, as was the local pro-
bation officer; and the son of a city council member was
discharged from West Point.”40  Of the sixteen charged, only one,
who steadfastly denied any involvement throughout, beat the
charges,41 while nine were convicted of sodomy and sentenced
from the state penitentiary, with sentences ranging from five years
to life.42  The legacy of the witch-hunt in Boise affected not only
the city for years to come, but also created fear in homosexuals all
over the country.43  Indeed, Idaho’s felony “crime against nature”
sodomy statute, which carried a penalty of five years to life,44 re-
35 The term “Boys of Boise” comes from the book of the same name. JOHN GER-
ASSI, BOYS OF BOISE: FUROR, VICE AND FOLLY IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1966).
36 Seth Randal & Alan Virta, Op-Ed., Idaho’s Original Same-Sex Scandal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2007, at 10.  The scandal sparked a civil case in response to criminal charges
against the men in which after summary judgment was rendered dismissing an action
for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, appellant sued
the defendant daily newspaper for printing, in 1995, a photograph of a nearly forty-
year-old handwritten statement given to police naming plaintiff as a party to homosex-
ual activity.  Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 30 (Idaho 2003).  The
supposed homosexual activity was to have occurred with another young man, F.J., the
son of a city council member. Id. at 31.  Neither F.J. nor Uranga were ever charged;
however, F.J. was expelled from Westpoint Academy as a result of the investigation.
Id.  The article in The Idaho Statesman was about the effects of the “Boys of Boise”
witch-hunt on the people put under investigation. Id. at 30–31.
37 Randal & Virta, supra note 36, at 10.
38 Id.
39 Uranga, 67 P.3d at 30.
40 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 168.
41 Randal & Virta, supra note 36, at 10.
42 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 168.
43 Randal & Virta, supra note 36, at 10.
44 Ex Parte Miller, 129 P. 1075, 1076 (Idaho 1913).  In Miller, the Idaho Supreme
Court ruled that the state’s sodomy law, which sets a minimum—but no maximum—
penalty, contemplates a sentence of life imprisonment, but found the legislature left
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mained in place until it was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas in
2003.45
Senator Larry Craig was raised on a farm in Idaho and was ten
years old when the 1955–56 scandal in Boise occurred.46  He was a
student at the University of Idaho when the subsequent book, The
Boys of Boise, was published in 1966.47  What exact impact the scan-
dal of 1955–56 had on Senator Craig is unknown; however, gener-
ally speaking, “[t]he lesson of the 1955 scandal was clear: sexual
misconduct—or even the mere perception that one is gay—could
ruin a man’s reputation.  But steadfast, straight-in-the-eye denial
just might get him off the hook.”48
B. Expressive Language in Tearooms
I am primarily concerned with the grieving family in my
parish, with the fact that we have lost such a wonderful man, and
the news media played such an important part in driving him to
suicide.  There is no question but that his learning that his name
had been published was the direct cause of his jumping off the
bridge.  While I agree with those who have told me that men
who need to search for their sexual outlet in public men’s
rooms are sick people, I would wonder whether these same peo-
ple would approve of our listing the names of people going into
mental hospitals.  I also would say very strongly that a society
that pays its policemen to spend hours on their haunches or
lying prostrate on the top of a building peering through a spy
hole to spy on men is a very sick society.49
Tearooms have a long and broad history in the United States
and constitute a substantial part of the free sex market for both
homosexual men and those who may never identify with homosex-
uality or any gay identity, society, or subculture.50  In Humphreys’
study of men who engage in impersonal sex in public places with
other men, 54% were married and living with their wives.51  How-
ever, Humphreys’ study was conducted in 1966, when being in the
the determination of maximum punishment at the discretion of the court. Id.  This
decision was followed in 1992 by an appellate court that found the possibility of life
imprisonment for private consensual activity to be reasonable.  State v. Hayes, 824
P.2d 163, 166 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992).
45 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
46 Randal & Virta, supra note 36, at 10.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Humphreys, supra note 4, at 81 (citing anonymous letter in 26 CHRISTIANITY AND
CRISIS 10, June 13, 1966, at 135).
50 Id. at 21.
51 Christopher Hitchens, So Many Men’s Rooms, So Little Time: Why Men Like Larry
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“closet” was not just the norm but also a necessity for many gay
men.  In a post-Lawrence era, why would gay men still need to use
tearooms and coded call-and-response signals to find gay sex?  Of
the men surveyed in Humphreys’ study, 38% did not identify as
homosexual or bisexual even though they participated in homosex-
ual sex.  What many of these men appreciate is “a sexual encounter
that was quick and easy and didn’t involve any wining and din-
ing.”52  For others it is the very essence and danger of potentially
being caught that may make secretive sexual encounters appealing.
Humphreys uses the term “breastplate of righteousness” to de-
scribe this mixture of repression and denial that many closeted
men experience.53  In order to hide or compensate for their homo-
sexual activity, many of the men surveyed put forth a public per-
sona of extreme conservatism and concern with family values.54
In an era before the news media was rife with examples of well-
known religious and politically conservative figures being routinely
“outed” as engaging in homosexual escapes,55 Humphreys ob-
served that “[a]s anticipated sanctions increase and autonomy de-
creases, the more elaborate and encompassing will be the
breastplate of righteousness the deviant assumes for his overt per-
formances in life.”56  When one’s reputation and career is built on
an image of conservatism, family values, and morality, emboldened
Craig Continue to Court Danger in Public Places, SLATE, Sept. 03, 2007, http://www.slate.
com/id/2173112/.
52 Id.
53 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 145.
54 Id. at 146.
55 In 2006, Reverend Ted Haggard, the former head of the National Association of
Evangelicals and a well known anti-gay “moral crusader” was exposed as having had
sexual liaisons with a gay male escort. See Mel Seesholtz, Rev. Ted Haggard: Still Playing
the Game, ONLINE JOURNAL, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.onlinejournal.com/artman/
publish/article_1406.shtml.  In 2006, ABC news also exposed Republican Congress-
man Mark Foley who was sending sexually explicit emails to a young former congres-
sional page. See Maddy Sauer, Former Page Says He Sent Foley’s Sexually Explicit IM to Rep.
Kolbe in 2001, ABC NEWS.COM, Dec. 6, 2006, http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/
2006/12/former_page_say.html.  And in 2007, Senator Larry Craig was arrested for
disorderly conduct in a bathroom in Minnesota.  While Senator Craig has continu-
ously denied ever engaging in homosexual sex, The Idaho Statesman, as well as many
other newspapers, has reported many allegations that the Senator had previous ho-
mosexual liaisons. See Dan Popkey, Men’s Room Arrest Reopens Questions About Sen.
Craig, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, Aug. 28, 2007, available at http://www.idahostatesman.
com/larrycraig/story/143801.html.  The “outing” of public figures and politicians,
particularly those who vote for anti-gay legislation has become so predominant, that
one blogger, Mike Rogers, has devoted an entire website to the practice of exposing
politicians who may engage in homosexual conduct, since July 2004.  Mike Rogers,
BlogActive, http://www.blogactive.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
56 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 146–47.
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by a publicly anti-gay persona, the notion of getting caught be-
comes all the more dangerous.  In fact, for some this is the appeal.
One man from the House of Commons in England, who par-
ticipated in tearoom encounters, noted that the continued appeal
of meeting someone in a bathroom or other public place— a meet-
ing leading to a casual sexual encounter—was that “[t]he thrills
were twofold.  First came the exhilaration of danger: the perma-
nent risk of being caught and exposed.  Second was the sense of
superiority that a double life could give.”57  Given both the thrill
and the stakes of being caught, there exists now as much as in the
past a need for a coded message system for men seeking to meet
other men discreetly.
A defining characteristic of a tearoom is silence.58  Humphreys
explains, “One may spend many hours in these buildings and wit-
ness dozens of sexual acts without hearing a word.”59  Of the fifty
systemic observations of tearoom encounters that Humphreys ob-
served and took notes, only fifteen included vocal utterances,
which generally consisted of nothing more than a whispered
“thanks” at the conclusion of a sex act.60  The silence of a tearoom
serves multiple purposes.  It arises out of a practical fear of incrimi-
nation as well as a desire for privacy, while also serving to guaran-
tee anonymity, and to “assure the impersonality of the sexual
liaison.”61  It is precisely this lack of personal involvement that cre-
ates the appeal of tearoom encounters for many men.  The appeal
of quick and anonymous relations is what drives many men to de-
sire sex that may carry so many ramifications, even post-Lawrence
where one may now legally engage in private sodomy.  Taking the
action to a bedroom in many respects destroys the anonymity, the
lack of physical and emotional involvement, and the pure physical
nature of a tearoom encounter.
Despite the silence that characterizes a tearoom, there is abun-
dant communication occurring.  Humphreys regularly refers to
tearooms as “games of chance” where every person has a role and
57 Hitchens, supra note 51.
58 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 20.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 12–13.
61 Id. at 13.  Humphreys defines this “impersonality” of a tearoom encounter in a
bathroom: “[S]imply, there is less emotional and physical involvement in restroom
fellatio [than in more private settings such as a car or room]. . . . Often, in tearoom
stalls, the only portions of the players’ bodies that touch are the mouth of the insertee
and the penis of the insertor; and the mouths of these partners seldom open for
speech.” Id.
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every movement carries significance.62  In this game the sexual en-
counter focuses on an eventual reward.63  He observed that “[t]he
tactics are determined by the players’ calculations of how best to
maximize profit, the primary reward being sexual pleasures under
preferred circumstances and the chief cost being possible exposure
to a hostile community.”64  Like other games of chance, the tea-
rooms have prescribed roles,65 and carry a set of rules66 that oper-
ate as a protective code. These rules serve as a set of norms
“common to all ephemeral encounters of a homosexual nature,
which no ritual performer may violate.”67  While the roles of tea-
room participants are fluid and may change instantaneously, the
rules governing the actions are not.68
As discussed, silence reigns in a tearoom.  So the communica-
tion of rules and roles occurs with rarely a word ever said.  Signals
are made with bodily movements, and even the passing of notes is
generally considered too risky.69  Communication occurs through
an intricate system of signals and bodily movements, which consti-
tute an expressive language.70  The coded language has an array of
62 Id. at 45.
63 Id. at 46.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 49.  Humphreys categorizes five participant roles in tearoom encounters,
with sub-roles within each category.  The basic categories and sub-roles include: 1)
“Players” to the action, who are subdivided into the “insertee” and the “insertor”; 2)
“Lookouts” who are subdivided into “waiters,” waiting to take part in an action, “mas-
turbators,” and “voyeurs”; 3) “straights” who do not participate in the action; 4)
“Teenagers” (or “chicken”) who are subdivided into four subgroups: a) “straights”; b)
“enlisters” who may want to get in on the action and may act as “waiters” or “look-
outs,” but are generally “too feared” to be let in on an action; c) “toughs” who harass
and sometimes attack tearoom participants; and d) “hustlers” who generally demand
payment to be an “insertor,” and if not paid may act as “toughs.” Id.  The last category
is: 5) “Agents of social control” which are subdivided into three types: a) vice squad
members; b) local policemen; c) other employees of the area being used, such as park
employees. Id.
66 Id. at 47–48.  Humphreys identifies the “universal and protective rules, which
are standard for all situations of homosexual casual sex encounters as: 1. Avoid the
exchange of biographical data, to the point of silence if in a public setting; 2. Watch
out for ‘chicken’ [teen-agers]—they’re dangerous game; 3. Never force your inten-
tions on anyone; 4. Don’t knock [criticize] a trick [sex partner]—he may be some-
body’s ‘mother’ [homosexual mentor]; 5. Never back down on trade agreements.
[‘Trade’ are ‘tricks’ who do not, as yet, consider themselves homosexual.  This group
includes most of the male prostitutes, ‘hustlers.’  Trade agreements, then, include
paying the amount promised, if a financial transaction is involved, and no kissing
above the belt, because most ‘trade’ think kissing is ‘queer.’].” Id.
67 Id. at 48.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 20.
70 Id.
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meanings such as ascertaining whether someone knows the lan-
guage, gaining consent, role identification, and determining
whether one would like to relocate.71 “Sex necessitates collective
action; and all collective action requires communication.  Mutually
understood signals must be conveyed, intentions expressed, and
the action sustained by reciprocal encouragement.”72
The first step in this collective action is positioning.73  Posi-
tioning refers to the manner in which a party identifies their loca-
tion within the bathroom.  For example, whether a party is located
at a urinal or in a stall may indicate what type of sex they are look-
ing for and what position they prefer in a sexual partner.74  The
next step is signaling, which may be done using eyes, hands, feet,
or through other bodily motions.75  Toe-tapping is a form of this
type of signaling:
[The toe-tapping] signal has been around for decades in the
United States and Europe.  Generally, one person initiates con-
tact by tapping his foot in a way that’s visible beneath the stall
divider.  If the second person responds with a similar tap, the
initiator moves his foot closer to the other person’s stall.  If the
other person makes a similar move, the first will inch closer yet
again.  The pair usually goes through the whole process a few
times, just to confirm that the signals aren’t an accident.
Next, one of the men will slide his hand under the divider.
This usually means he’s inviting the other person to present
himself, as if to say, “Show me what you got.”  The partner can
respond by kneeling on the floor and presenting his penis or
rear end underneath the divider.  Or he can swipe his own hand
under the divider, as if to say, “You go first.” Some married men
make a point of displaying their wedding band to . . .  make
themselves more alluring.76
Once the signals have been reciprocated, maneuvering sometimes
occurs, if needed, to indicate “which men wish to serve as in-
sertees.”77  As soon as positions have been taken and signals have
been made and responded to, the most crucial part of the ex-
change occurs if there is to be public sex—contracting.78
71 See id.
72 Id. at 59.
73 See id. at 62.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 64.
76 Christopher Beam, Bathroom Sex FAQ:  Cruising Signals, Legal Issues, and Larry
Craig’s “Wide Stance,” SLATE, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2173033/.
77 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 65.
78 Id. at 66.
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Tearoom trades are non-coercive in nature and consent is es-
sential.79  Players signal their consent through bodily movements,
which set both the terms of the forthcoming sexual exchange, as
well as mutual consent.80  At this point one party generally exposes
themselves to the other party, moves into the other party’s stall, or
touches the other’s penis.81  If the move is not rejected by either
party, then the contract has been executed.82  The parties’ inten-
tions have already been made in the positioning and reciprocated
signaling phase, so this contracting phase exists there to “formalize
the agreement.”83  Furthermore, in Humphreys’ extensive observa-
tions, no physical overtures were ever made to men who had not
already shown consent by exposing their erect penises.84  As Hum-
phreys noted, “[u]nder normal circumstances, such communica-
tion is ritualized in those patterns of word and movement we call
courtship and love-making.”85  In normal situations people are also
not arrested for expressing courtship rituals or flirtation made pub-
licly.  Unless the contracting phase has completed, and there has
been an actual legal violation due to public exposure or public sex,
to preemptively arrest someone for engaging in a courtship ritual
within a tearoom is to infringe upon that person’s mode of expres-
sion in violation of the First Amendment.
Although one may think of the abuses and the stigma of ho-
mosexuality as a relic of the past, the harassment of people who
engage in homosexual conduct in tearooms has not ceased.  Pri-
vate consensual sodomy has been legalized, yet arrests for disor-
derly conduct, invasion of privacy, and public indecency in
tearooms are still common practice.  Such arrests, when made
before any public nudity or sexual act occurs, violate the free
speech rights of the men who occupy tearooms.  While this article
does not advocate the legalization of public sex, it does argue that
the intricate modes of expressive conduct that are used to create a
courtship ritual within a tearoom are forms of speech that should
be protected by the First Amendment.86
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 67. Usually, Prior to the contracting phase, none of the communications
that have occurred violate a law since generally, up to this point, there has not been
any public exposure or public sex.
84 Id. at 88.
85 Id. at 59.
86 While in theory disorderly conduct statutes may be used to arrest heterosexual
people as well, the operations are generally set up to target homosexual men. This
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II. THE CASE AGAINST CRAIG FROM ARREST TO THE COURT’S
DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW
“Underneath the libertine, the pervert . . . forcing them into hiding so as
to make possible their discovery. . .Wherever was the chance they might
appear, devices of surveillance were installed; traps were laid for compel-
ling admissions.”87
Between May 31 and August 13, 2007, forty men were arrested
at the Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport bathroom for va-
rious forms of lewd and disorderly conduct, indecent exposure, or
loitering.88  The arrests were the result of a large-scale sting opera-
tion by the Minneapolis Police Department at the world’s fifteenth
busiest airport.  In fact, the airport had become known in some
circles as a site for homosexual hook-ups.  One man told the police
after he was arrested that that the airport was “[a] busy place for
lewd conduct.”89  Of these arrests, one has become well known—
that of United States Senator Larry Craig.  Senator Craig’s actions
on June 11, as described by the police, were less blatant than those
of some men with lesser charges.90 Nonetheless, of the forty men
arrested, Senator Craig was the only one91 charged with both disor-
derly conduct92 and interference with privacy.93  The other men
Comment focuses on potential violations of First Amendment speech that occurs
when disorderly conduct statutes are applied in sting operations.  However, the Four-
teenth Amendment implications of the arbitrary enforcement of such statutes, and
whether the required showing of animus in such enforcement violates the holding of
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1992), are beyond the scope of this Comment.
87 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 39, 42 (Vin-
tage Books 1990) (1978).
88 Wilson, supra note 1.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 MINN. STAT. § 609.72(1)(3) (2007):
Whoever does any of the following in a public or private place, includ-
ing on a school bus, knowing, or having reasonable grounds to know
that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an
assault or breach of the peace, is guilty of disorderly conduct, which is a
misdemeanor: (3) Engages in offensive, obscene, abusive, boisterous, or
noisy conduct or in offensive, obscene, or abusive language tending rea-
sonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.
Id.
93 MINN. STAT. § 609.746(1)(c) (2007):
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who:(1) surreptitiously gazes,
stares, or peeps in the window or other aperture of a sleeping room in a
hotel, as defined in section 327.70, subdivision 3, a tanning booth, or
other place where a reasonable person would have an expectation of
privacy and has exposed or is likely to expose their intimate parts, as
defined in section 609.341, subdivision 5, or the clothing covering the
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were charged with either disorderly conduct, interference with pri-
vacy, indecent exposure, or loitering.94
According to the police arrest report,95 Senator Craig entered
the men’s bathroom at 12:13 p.m. on June 11, 2007. He proceeded
to walk towards the back stalls where he stopped and then peered
into the stall where Police Officer Karsnia, who was in plain
clothes, was located.96  The Senator then entered the stall to Kar-
snia’s left, and placed a roller bag in front of the stall, a move the
police officer says is often done by individuals engaging in lewd
conduct in order to block the view from the front of the stall.97
Senator Craig then began to tap his right foot and moved it close
to Karsnia’s.98  It was this movement of Craig’s foot which the of-
ficer identified “as a signal used by persons wishing to engage in
lewd conduct,” despite the fact that the officer admitted that there
were several other people in the public restroom.99  After interpret-
ing the toe-tap as an established signal for sexual solicitation, the
officer replied by tapping his own foot.100  Craig then touched his
right foot to the officer’s left foot.  Next, Craig “swiped his hand
under the stall divider for a few seconds,” and repeated this motion
two more times.101  Craig and the officer disagree as to whether it
was Craig’s right or left hand, with the officer insisting it was
Craig’s left hand under the divider and that he saw Craig’s wed-
ding ring.102  Karsnia then placed his police identification by the
floor where Craig could see it and pointed to the exit, at which
point the had their first verbal exchange, with Craig responding,
“No.”103
Senator Craig has resisted this interpretation of events from
immediate area of the intimate parts; and (2) does so with intent to
intrude upon or interfere with the privacy of the occupant.
Id.
94 Wilson, supra note 1.
95 Airport Police Department, Minnesota Report Form, Arrest Report, available
at http://media.idahostatesman.com/smedia/2007/08/28/14/craig_police_report.
source.prod_affiliate.36.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Arrest Report].
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Investigative Sergeant Dave Karsnia and Detective Noel Nelson Interview with
Larry Craig, available at http://www.idahostatesman.com/1264/story/343210.html
(follow “Minneapolis police officer interview of Sen. Craig” hyperlink) [hereinafter
Interview with Larry Craig].
103 Arrest Report, supra note 95.
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the beginning, and continues to insist it was a misunderstanding.104
Prior to being read his Miranda rights, when the officer told Craig
that he would not bring him to jail, Craig responded, “[y]ou solic-
ited me.”105  In an interview between Officer Karsnia and Senator
Craig, conducted after the arrest, Craig again insisted that the of-
ficer solicited him, that he has a “wide stance,” and that their feet
merely “bumped.”106 Craig specifically explained that he reached
down with his right hand on which he did not have a wedding
band, in order to pick up a piece of paper.107  Nowhere in the po-
lice report or interview does the officer inform the Senator of the
exact charges against him or the applicable penalties.108  An inter-
esting part of the transcript is when Senator Craig and Officer Kar-
snia have a disagreement about what occurred in the bathroom,
Craig states “I am not gay, I don’t do these kinds of things,” to
which the officer replies, “It doesn’t matter. I don’t care about sex-
ual preferences or anything like that.”109  Craig then responds, “I
know you don’t. You’re out to enforce the law . . . .  But you
shouldn’t be out to entrap people either.”110  Throughout the tran-
scripts the Senator denies the officer’s account of what happened,
yet as time goes on the officer makes statements such as, “I don’t
call media,”111  “I’m not gonna take you to jail as long as your [sic]
cooperative,”112 and “I’m gonna say I’m just disappointed in you
sir.  I just really am.  I expect this from the guy that we get out of
the hood.  I mean people vote for you . . . embarrassing, embarrass-
ing.  No wonder why we’re going down the tubes.”113  Eventually
Craig stops arguing with the officer and, before leaving, makes the
following final statement: “[a]ll right, you saw something that
didn’t happen.”114  It is never clear in the transcript that Craig
agrees with the officer’s interpretation of events.  What is clear,
104 Interview with Larry Craig, supra note 102.
105 Minnesota v. Craig, 27 CR 07-043231, at *3-4 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2007) (or-
der denying defendant’s motion to withdraw plea), available at http://www.mncourts.
gov/district/4/?page=1981 (follow “Order” pdf hyperlink).
106 Interview with Larry Craig, supra note 102.
107 Id.
108 Motion to Withdraw Plea, Minnesota v. Craig, 27-CR-07-043231, at *5 (Minn
Dist. Ct. Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/district/4/?page=1981
(follow “Motion by Larry Craig to Withdraw Plea” pdf hyperlink) [hereinafter Motion
to Withdraw Plea].
109 Interview with Larry Craig, supra note 102, at 2.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 3.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 6.
114 Id.
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however, is that Craig feels entrapped because the officer knows
that Craig is a United States Senator and that the arrest would be
an item of interest to the media and to voters.
Ultimately, Senator Craig signed a petition to plead guilty to
the misdemeanor charges, which included an acknowledgement
that he reviewed the charges against him on August 1, 2007.115
The shame and possible publicity of the arrest were there just as
they had been for the men in Boise when Craig was growing up.
Craig’s “breastplate of righteousness”116 had been pierced, and
“Senator Craig felt compelled to grasp the lifeline offered him by
the police officer; namely that if he were to submit to an interview
and plead guilty, then none of the officer’s allegations would be
made public.”117  That, of course, did not happen and on August
27, 2007, Roll Call, a newspaper covering activities on Capitol Hill,
reported the Senator’s arrest.118  The Idaho Statesman, the same pa-
per that led the “Boys of Boise” expose´ in 1955, had been investi-
gating allegations of possible homosexual activity by the Senator
prior to the June arrest and had asked the Senator in May if he had
ever engaged in homosexual conduct.119  The day after Roll Call
ran its item, the Idaho Statesman ran the story on their front page.120
Craig’s arrest immediately became a national news story, particu-
larly in light of the Senator’s very conservative and anti-gay public
views and voting record.121
A. Craig’s Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea
On September 10, 2007, the Senator entered a motion to with-
draw his guilty plea.  The trial court denied this motion on Octo-
ber 4.122  The court noted that “[i]n Minnesota, a criminal
defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea.”123  A Minnesota court may only allow a defendant to with-
115 Motion to Withdraw Plea, see supra note 108, at 5.
116 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 145.
117 Motion to Withdraw Plea, supra note 108, at 2.
118 John McArdle, Craig Arrested, Pleads Guilty Following Incident in Airport Restroom but
Says He Did Nothing Wrong, ROLL CALL, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://www.rollcall.
com/news/19764-1.html.
119 Popkey, supra note 55.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Tomas Alex Tizon, Idaho is Red-faced Over Scandal; In the Conservative
State, the Craig Incident Elicits Outrage, Shame and a Sense of Betrayal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2007, at A1; Jill Zuckerman, ‘Deeply Sorry’ Senator Resigns Amid Scandal, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
2, 2007, at C1.
122 Craig, 27 CR 07-043231, at *27.
123 Id. at *9 (citing Shorter v. State, 511 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 1994)).
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draw a plea he submitted after sentencing if the motion to do so “is
timely made and ‘withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest in-
justice.’”124  To demonstrate a manifest injustice, the defendant
must show that the plea was “not accurately, voluntarily, or intelli-
gently made,”125 and that the evidence is insufficient to support a
guilty plea as a matter of law.126  This high standard reflects a pub-
lic policy that “favors the finality of judgments” and does not “en-
courage accused persons to ‘play games’ with the court by setting
aside judgments of conviction based upon pleas made with deliber-
ation and accepted by the court with caution.”127
Senator Craig argued that his plea had not been made volun-
tarily but had been “coerced by the promises or threats of the in-
vestigating officer,”128 and that he had maintained his innocence
throughout the trial.129  The court rejected these arguments, par-
ticularly the contention that “if one ignore[d] the contents of the
plea petition, [Craig had] consistently maintained his inno-
cence.”130  The judge noted that disorderly conduct is a general
intent crime and that even if Craig had not intended to offend he
could still be liable for the criminal behavior of entry into an occu-
pied stall with his eyes, hand, and foot.131  There had also been a
two-month lapse between Craig’s arrest and his plea, and during
this time he had spoken several times with the prosecutor, who en-
couraged him to consult an attorney, which the Senator did not
do.132  In the court’s view these facts negated any reasonable con-
clusion that the officer’s interrogation had overridden Craig’s free
will and coerced him into pleading guilty to avoid media scrutiny
and jail.133  The court also noted that the Senator did not chal-
lenge his sentence or the “legal validity of the conviction or the
fairness or appropriateness of the negotiation.”134  Finally, the
court stated that Craig was an intelligent, college-educated man
who “knew what he was saying, reading, and signing” when he re-
viewed, executed, and mailed his plea of guilty.135 Therefore the
124 Id. (citing 49 MINN.S.A. RULES CRIM. PROC. § 15.05(1)).
125 Id. (citing Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn. 2002)).
126 Motion to Withdraw Plea, supra note 108, at 12.
127 Craig, 27 CR 07-043231, at *9 (citing Kaiser, 641 N.W.2d at 903).
128 Id. at *2
129 Id. at *7.
130 Id. at *7.
131 Id. at *8, 25.
132 Id. at *17.
133 Id. at *17.
134 Id. at *10.
135 See id. at *17-18.
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court held that Craig had made his plea accurately, voluntarily and
intelligently and that the evidence supported the conviction; the
court subsequently denied the motion to withdraw.136
B. The American Civil Liberties Union’s Amicus Brief in Support of
Craig
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) requested per-
mission to file an amicus brief in support of Craig’s motion.137  The
State opposed the motion on a trial court level and asked that the
brief be stricken.138  The judge granted permission to the ACLU to
file a brief, noting that the “the area of privacy rights is an impor-
tant one, and [that the] Court appreciates the guidance provided
by the ACLU brief.”139
The ACLU argued that Minnesota’s disorderly conduct statute
is unconstitutionally broad and restricts free speech, and that a
conviction on the facts of the case would violate the free speech
guarantee of the First Amendment, in light of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court’s ruling in S.L.J.:140
The First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution require that a law which covers both protected and un-
protected speech: . . . not be so overbroad as to pose a real and
substantial threat of ensnaring protected as well as unprotected
speech; . . . provide clear standards, to law enforcement and to
the public, about where it may be legitimately applied and
where it may not; . . . [and] be well crafted to serve the legiti-
mate regulation of speech and not to ensnare protected
speech.141
In S.L.J., the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the disorderly conduct statute by construing it narrowly
to refer only to “fighting words.”142  The court however rejected
the ACLU’s argument saying that the S.L.J. holding focuses only on
the verbal language portion of the disorderly conduct statute and
that the Defendant was charged under the “conduct” portion of
the statute. Further, the court stated that the holding of S.L.J.,
“does not address or place any constitutional limitation on the
136 Id. at *27.
137 Id. at *26.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978).
141 Memorandum of Law for American Civil Liberties Union, et. al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Defendant, State v. Craig, No. 27 CR 07-043231, at 1–2 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Oct. 4, 2007) [hereinafter ACLU Memorandum].
142 In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 419.
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non-verbal conduct portion of the statute.”143  The court dismissed
the ACLU’s argument that the conviction is void because of a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy for consensual sex in a public rest-
room under State v. Bryant.144 The court reasoned that the
defendant was arrested not for soliciting sex, but for the “criminal
behavior . . . [of] entry into an occupied stall with his eyes, hands
and foot.”145
The court in Minnesota v. Craig misinterpreted the holding of
S.L.J. when it asserted that Craig’s “entry into an occupied stall with
his eyes, hand and foot” was “criminal behavior”146 rather than the
defendant’s language. This language is protected under the hold-
ing of S.L.J. and under the First Amendment.  The next section will
show that Craig’s conduct was symbolic speech, analogous to other
forms of symbolic speech that have been recognized by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.  It will also show that Craig’s symbolic
speech does not constitute “fighting words” nor does it constitute
the solicitation of an unlawful activity since solicitation of consen-
sual non-commercial private sex between adults is legal. Even ac-
cepting the police report’s interpretation of events as read and
accepted by Senator Craig, the actions for which he was arrested
are constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.
III. CRAIG’S “TOE-TAPPING” WAS EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT THAT
SHOULD BE PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Was Craig’s Conduct Speech?
Expressive conduct and symbolic speech involve conduct that
imparts communication or some type of message.147  Furthermore,
“it is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expres-
sion of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”148  In general, ex-
pressive conduct is protected from government regulation under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.149  Even expressive conduct
which may be morally disapproved of by many has often found pro-
tection, or at least recognition, as expressive conduct that may be
afforded the protection of the First Amendment, such as the burn-
143 Craig, 27 CR 07-043231, at *26.
144 State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1970).
145 Craig, 27 CR 07-043231, at *26.
146 Id.
147 See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
148 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
149 Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103 (W.D. Ark. 2000).
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ing of flags,150 the burning of crosses,151 and nude dancing.152
“[E]ven crudity of expression may be constitutionally pro-
tected.”153  However, the Court has acknowledged a limit on what it
accepts as expressive conduct.154  In Spence v. Washington, the Su-
preme Court established a test that required a determination of
whether there is intent to communicate a specific message and,
given the context, whether it is likely that an audience would un-
derstand the message.155
Every movement a participant makes upon entering a tearoom
is embedded with meaning.156  “Sex necessitates collective action;
and all collective action requires communication.  Mutually under-
stood signals must be conveyed, intentions expressed, and the ac-
tion sustained by reciprocal encouragement.”157  The
communications for which Craig was arrested was a form of court-
ship designed to gain consent of the person whom Craig did not
know was an undercover officer.  If his signals had not been recip-
rocated, then no offense would have been made for which he
could be arrested, since no illegal nudity or unlawful solicitation of
an illegal sexual act was ever made.  The conduct for which Craig
was arrested served to position, signal, and maneuver in order to
gain the other’s parties consent for private sex.  The actions were
embedded with meaning and should be protected by the First
Amendment.
The conduct for which Craig was arrested under the disor-
derly conduct statute included his first acts of positioning.  When
Craig entered the bathroom the officer was already in a stall.158  In
tearoom parlance, “those who occupy a stall upon entering are
playing what might be called the Passive-Insertee System.  By mak-
150 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
151 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003).
152 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
153 State v. Drake, 325 A.2d 52, 55 (Me. 1974) (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973)).
154 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”).
155 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–411 (1974); see also Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (citing Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)) (“It is also true that a message may be delivered by conduct
that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be un-
derstood by the viewer to be communicative.”).
156 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 60.
157 Id. at 59.
158 Arrest Report, supra note 95.
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ing such an opening bid, they indicate to other participants their
intention to serve as fellator.”159  By already occupying a stall in a
known tearoom the officer was positioned in a manner that other
participants may have “read” him as a participant.  In such in-
stances “a man who knows the rules and wishes to play will stand
comfortably back from the urinal, allowing his gaze to shift from
side to side or to the ceiling”160 which is exactly what Craig did and
what the officer was looking for a party to do in this sting opera-
tion.  The officer notes that Craig was looking into the officer’s
stall through the crack in the door, looking at his hands, fidgeting,
looking into the stall again, and repeating this pattern of con-
duct.161  When the officer did not move his position from the stall,
Craig then entered the stall to the left of the undercover officer’s
stall and placed his bag against the stall door.162  In his police re-
port of the incident Officer Karsnia wrote, “[m]y experience has
shown that individuals engaging in lewd conduct use their bags to
block the view from the front of their stall.”163  Now that both Craig
and the officer were positioned in a manner consistent with the
rules and roles of the tearoom, the signaling began.
When Craig tapped his right foot, the Officer “recognized this
as a signal used by persons wishing to engage in lewd conduct.”164
Rather than make clear that the officer did not want to engage in
the conduct, the officer returned the signals moving his foot up
and down slowly,” to which Craig then “mov[ed] his right foot so
that it touched the side of [the undercover officer’s] left foot
which was within [the undercover officer’s] stall area.”165  In order
to further gain consent, Craig then began to maneuver his body so
that his left hand showed his wedding ring,166 which appeals to
many in tearooms and could be seen as another signal by the of-
ficer.  According to the arrest report,167 Craig began swiping his
hand underneath the stall divider with his palm facing up toward
the ceiling, enabling the undercover officer to see the tips of his
fingers on the officer’s side of the divider. Craig repeated the swip-
ing in the same motion for a few seconds, enabling the officer to
see that it was his left hand, due to the position of his thumb and
159 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 62.
160 Id.
161 Arrest Report, supra note 95.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 ACLU Memorandum, supra note 141, at 3.
166 Arrest Report, supra note 95.
167 Id.
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his gold wedding ring.168  Clearly, Craig’s actions were not just the
generic actions of a man using a public restroom, but rather were
embedded with expressive meaning following the rules and roles
of the tearoom, and as noted, understood, and reciprocated by the
arresting officer.
Even a study published in the UCLA Law Review in 1966 at a
time when homosexuality was both illegal and socially stigmatized,
and cited by Humphreys in Tearoom Trade, showed the entrapment
nature of sting operations of tearooms:
Empirical data indicate the utilization of police manpower for
decoy enforcement is not justified.  Societal interests are in-
fringed only when a solicitation to engage in a homosexual act
creates a reasonable risk of offending public decency.  The inci-
dence of such solicitations is statistically insignificant.  The ma-
jority of homosexual solicitations are made only if the other
individual appears responsive and are ordinarily accomplished
by quiet conversation and the use of gestures and signals having
significance only to other homosexuals.  Such unobtrusive solici-
tations do not involve an element of public outrage.  The rare
indiscriminate solicitations of the general public do not justify
the commitment of police resources to suppress such
behavior.169
Given the nature of the call initiated by Craig and the response by
the officer who was familiar with such positioning and signaling, it
is clear that there was in fact an intent to communicate a specific
message of sexual interest, and it continued because it was recipro-
cated.  Since the aim of the conduct is to attract those who know
the rules and roles as opposed to those who do not, it is clear that
Craig’s conduct was aimed to send a message that would ensure
consent from those who understood any such action.  In an airport
known for gay cruising, one that specifically was being targeted by
the police as such, there was a substantial audience.  Therefore,
Craig’s conduct satisfies the elements of expressive conduct.
B. Was Craig’s Conduct Protected by the First Amendment?
Senator Craig’s conduct on June 11, 2007 constituted expres-
sive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment, which is a
categorically protected form of speech that does not qualify as
“fighting words” or obscene speech.  In S.L.J., the Minnesota Su-
168 Id.
169 HUMPHREYS, supra note 4, at 88 (emphasis omitted) (citing Jon J. Gallo et al, The
Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Adminis-
tration in Los Angeles County, 13 UCLA L. REV. 643, 795–96 (1966)).
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preme Court held that the criminal statute under which Craig was
arrested is a constitutional proscription against the use of “fighting
words.”170  In this case two fourteen-year-old girls were convicted
under Minnesota’s disorderly conduct statute171 for saying “fuck
you pigs” to police from fifteen to thirty feet away.172  The case
reached the Minnesota Supreme Court, which analyzed both the
constitutionality of the statute and whether the defendants’ speech
fell within the constitutional constraints of the statute.  In Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire173 and Cohen v. California,174 in which the Su-
preme Court examined a First Amendment challenge to a New
Hampshire statute that prohibited the use of “offensive, derisive or
annoying” language in a public place,175 offensive speech statutes
like Minnesota’s were found to be constitutional only if criminal
prosecution is permitted solely for “fighting words.”176  The term
“fighting words” has been defined as those “personally abusive epi-
thets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a mat-
ter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction,”177 or  “words ‘which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’”178 Words
that do not fit this definition, no matter how offensive they may be,
are not subject to criminal sanctions.  If the statute being scruti-
nized punishes more than “fighting words,” it must either be struck
down as facially overbroad, or if possible, construed narrowly to
make it constitutional.179
The Court held that the language of the statute as a whole is
both overly broad and vague since it applies not only to language
that could be construed as “fighting words,” but that it also prohib-
its speech deemed “offensive, obscene or abusive” language.180  As
long as the statute could be narrowed to contemplate punishment
for speech that is protected under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court upheld its constitutionality by construing
170 In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 418–419.
171 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.72 (1) (3) (2007).
172 In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 415.
173 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
174 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
175 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
176 Id. at 572.
177 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
178 Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (citing Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572).
179 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
180 In re S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 418–19.
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it narrowly to refer only to “fighting words.”181
The conduct engaged in by Craig—the intricate courtship
rituals of positioning, signaling and maneuvering before gaining
consent to participate in any sexual activity—does not constitute
“fighting words,” nor is it obscene, offensive, or abusive language
that is restricted by S.L.J.  However, the trial court judge ruled that
because Craig was arrested under the conduct portion of the disor-
derly conduct statute, S.L.J. was inapplicable; that case only places
limitations on verbal “language” and does not place any limitation
on the conduct portion of the statute.182  However, such an inter-
pretation ignores the “symbolic speech” significance of Craig’s con-
duct.  It ignores that his speech expressed an idea reasonably
understood by a significant portion of the public, including the
arresting officer who reciprocated the mode of speech. Craig’s ac-
tions were not merely conduct, but rather also symbolic speech.  As
a result, the S.L.J. holding should apply to the constitutionality of
the state’s disorderly conduct statute as applied to those who parti-
pate in using the symbolic speech.
C. Fighting Words and Symbolic Speech
An analogous form of nonverbal conduct considered to be
constitutionally protected symbolic speech was analyzed in Nichols
v. Chacon.183  The two issues presented in this case were whether
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated when he was
charged with disorderly conduct for having “flipped off” the defen-
dant, a state trooper; and whether at the time this incident oc-
curred, the state trooper could reasonably have believed plaintiff’s
action constituted disorderly conduct under the applicable state
criminal statute.184
As a rule, retaliation based on the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights has long been recognized as a basis for liability.185  In
general, expressive conduct is protected from government regula-
tion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  As has oft been
said, “even crudity of expression may be constitutionally pro-
tected.”186  Further, “[n]onverbal conduct constitutes speech if it is
intended to convey a particularized message and the likelihood is
great that the message will be understood by those who view it,
181 Id. at 419.
182 Craig, 27 CR 07-043231, at *26.
183 Nichols v. Chacon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (W.D. Ark. 2000).
184 Id. at 1101.
185 Id. at 1103.
186 Id. at 1103 (citing State v. Drake, 325 A.2d 52, 55 (Me. 1974)).
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regardless of whether it is actually understood in a particular in-
stance in such a way.”187  In addition, “[s]peech is often provocative
and challenging . . . [but it] is nevertheless protected against cen-
sorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above pub-
lic inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”188
The officer argued that even if the plaintiff’s speech is pro-
tected under the First Amendment, “a reasonable official is not ex-
pected to understand the subtleties of First Amendment law,”189
and based on his knowledge of the state’s disorderly conduct stat-
ute he reasonably believed that the Plaintiff had violated the stat-
utes.190  He further argued that a reasonable person would
describe giving the “middle finger” as an obscene gesture.191  The
court noted that missing from this argument was any suggestion as
to whether the action caused “any public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or alarm.”192  The officer was the only one to witness the ges-
ture and experience annoyance because of it; therefore, the
conduct did not satisfy the public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm requirement under the disorderly conduct statute, even if it
was not constitutionally protected First Amendment speech.193
The court noted that statutes proscribing the use of abusive or ob-
scene language or the making of obscene gestures in public places
have repeatedly been struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad
if they prohibited a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected expression, but that “fighting words” were not protected.194
In precisely the same manner as Minnesota in S.L.J., the Ar-
kansas disorderly conduct statute at issue in Nichols was found to be
constitutional by the Arkansas Supreme Court premised on a limit-
ing construction of the statute to the “fighting words” rule of
Chaplinsky.195 However, unlike the court in Minnesota v. Craig, the
court in Nichols extended the definition of speech to include non-
verbal conduct that functioned as symbolic speech, and thus ex-
tended the “fighting words” limitation to symbolic non-verbal con-
duct.  The Arkansas court held that while the plaintiff’s middle-
187 Id. at 1104 (citing Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 674 (8th Cir. 1967)).
188 Id. (citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
189 Id. at 1102 (citing Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 673–674 (8th Cir. 1967)).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1104.
195 Id. at 1110.
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finger gesture to the officer may have been crude, insensitive, of-
fensive, and disturbing to the officer, it was not obscene nor did it
constitute “fighting words,” although it was non-verbal it was pro-
tected as “free speech” under the First Amendment.196  The court
said that as a matter of law the officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity and that his arrest of the plaintiff under the disorderly
conduct statute violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights.197
Although on appeal Nichols was subsequently affirmed by the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where Minnesota is situated, con-
stitutional issues were neither raised nor considered.198
Given these rulings, if the holding of Nichols were to apply in
Minnesota, Craig’s conduct would not constitute “fighting words.”
It does, however, constitute symbolic speech via recognizable bod-
ily movements embedded with meaning—similar to the manner in
which giving someone the “finger” is symbolic speech through
non-verbal, easily recognizable bodily movements.  Further, even if
the state did not recognize Craig’s conduct as speech—since the
only person who encountered Craig’s speech was the arresting of-
ficer—the only public offense was to him and not the general pub-
lic, because it did not provoke the requisite “alarm, anger, or
resentment in others,”199 it was not a public inconvenience, and
thus still fails to qualify as disorderly conduct.  If, on the other
hand, the holding of Nichols were to be accepted and Craig’s con-
duct was rightly found to be symbolic speech deserving of First
Amendment protection, then like in Nichols, Craig’s First and
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the officer.  The of-
ficers in both Nichols’ and Craig’s cases understood the meaning
of symbolic speech and despite a lack of offense to the general
public, they both arrested the other party for disorderly conduct.
In Nichols, the court said that as a matter of law by violating the
plaintiff’s fundamental right to free speech, his Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity was waived and he could be held liable.200  If the
officer in Minnesota also understood Craig’s speech and arrested
him in violation of his free speech constitutional guarantee, per-
haps he should be held liable as well.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Nichols v. Chacon, No. 00-3331, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21062 (8th Cir. 2001).
199 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.72(Subd. 1)(3) (2007).
200 Id.
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D. The Solicitation of Consensual Private Sex Between Adults Does Not
Constitute Unlawful Activity
Just as with “fighting words,” the state may regulate the solici-
tation of unlawful activity.201  In People v. Uplinger,202 the court rec-
ognized that a statute prohibiting loitering “in a public place for
the purpose of engaging, or soliciting another person to engage, in
deviate sexual intercourse or other sexual behavior of a deviate na-
ture”203 was a companion statute to anti-sodomy statutes between
consenting adults.  The court had previously held in People v. Onofre
“that the state may not constitutionally prohibit sexual behavior
conducted in private between consenting adults.”204  The court
said that the clear purpose of “the loitering statute [was] to punish
conduct anticipatory to the act of consensual sodomy,”205 and since
the ultimate conduct—consensual sex in private between adults—
was now legal, that conduct contemplating this act could not be
criminal.  The New York statute was “devoid of a requirement that
the conduct proscribed be in any way offensive . . . to others.”206
Since consensual sodomy between adults is not a crime post-
Lawrence, it logically follows that an invitation to engage in private
sex should not be a crime.  Applying People v. Onofre, a statute de-
signed to punish conduct anticipatory to the act of consensual sod-
omy should also be invalid.  While one may argue that public sex is
an unlawful activity, it is not clear as to whether sex in a bathroom
would be considered private or public given that many courts have
gone different ways on this issue.  If sex occurs in a stall silently and
no one else knows it is happening, does it actually cause public
offense?
In State v. Bryant,207 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
two men engaged in sexual activity in a department store restroom
with the stall door closed had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.208  They were, the court held, acting in a private, not public
space.209  Craig was charged with invasion of privacy by violating a
“place where a reasonable person would have an expectation of
201 ACLU Memorandum, supra note 141, at 5 (citing Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.
45, 55 (1982)).
202 58 N.Y.2d 936 (N.Y. 1983).
203 Id. at 937.
204 Id. at 938 (citing People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 (N.Y. 1980)).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1970).
208 ACLU Memorandum, supra note 141, at 8.
209 Bryant, 177 N.W.2d at 206.
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privacy” when he put his hand and foot under the divider of the
two stalls.210  Therefore, breaking the public–private boundary
only occurred after Craig thought that he had obtained consent
because of the officer’s reciprocated signals.  Even in charging
Craig with violating the officer’s privacy, however, the court is im-
plicitly acknowledging that the bathroom stall is a place where one
would have an expectation of privacy, as held in Bryant.
Even in Craig’s home state of Idaho, which has been known
for having stringent sodomy laws prior to Lawrence, in State v.
Limberhand,211 the defendant was arrested for masturbating in a
closed toilet stall by police searching without a warrant for “homo-
sexual activity” at a rest stop. The court there found that the defen-
dant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a closed toilet stall
and that a police officer’s warrantless observation of him from an
adjoining stall violated his privacy interests.212  Solicitation to have
sex in a stall would be a lawful invitation to have consensual sex
between two adults in a private setting, so long as there is actual
consent and so long as no officer is using the signals of courtship to
entrap people.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gay rights have come a long way since Humphreys’ studies of
tearoom participants in 1966 America.  However the appeal of the
tearoom has remained for many.  For some it is the appeal of
causal anonymous sex even though they may be able to live their
life as an “out” gay man.  For others it is still the only release they
may have in a life where they feel that they have to remain in the
“closet” due to social, religious, community or family pressure. For
those who may not even identify as homosexual, it is just a way to
have casual or anonymous sex.  No matter the reason, it does not
look as though tearooms will be disappearing any time soon.
While I am not advocating for the legalization of public sex, it
seems that the intricate language developed as part of the tearoom
culture serves to create a code of consensual sex and privacy that
will not interfere with others in the tearoom.  The language used to
express one’s desires in a tearoom is symbolic speech that func-
tions in a manner similar to conduct that people use daily at work,
in bars, and in all other public spaces to meet people, flirt, and
have sex or relationships. Given that private, consensual sodomy
210 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.746(c)(1)(2006).
211 State v. Limberhand, 788 P.2d 857 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
212 Id.
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between adults is no longer illegal, arresting people for expressive
conduct to engage in a lawful act does nothing more than infringe
upon individuals’ First Amendment free speech rights and main-
tain the stigma of homophobia in America.
